Знал ли Ф.Д. Рузвельт о подготовке нападения на Перл-Харбор

War Plan Orange had its origins soon after the turn of the century when the US Navy and particularly those officers at the Naval War College recognized the growing economic and maritime threat of the Japanese empire and began a plan to counter its perceived threat to US power and influence in the region. US interests in the Western Pacific included its possessions in the Philippines, Guam, and, Hawaii, and its continued Open Door trade policy with China. By the early 1920s the plan’s focus had shifted away from guaranteeing access to China and towards countering Japan. Through the 1920s and into the early 1930s the plan underwent many modifications and adjustments reflective of the personalities involved in the planning efforts, incorporation of new technologies, treaty limitations, and evolving strategy.

The plan, although frequently modified, consisted of three basic phases. In Phase I, Japan, code-named “Orange,” would initiate the conflict by attacking to seize the lightly defended American, “Blue,” outposts to assure its access to necessary raw materials in the south and west. The blue navy, concentrated in homeports along the west coast of the United States would then mobilize in the Eastern Pacific. In phase II, Blue’s fleet would steam westward across the Central Pacific toward seizure of the Philippines. Orange would avoid decisive conflict, instead resisting with expendable forces in an effort to attrite Blue while trading distance for time. Blue would continue to advance and retake the Philippines and eventually the two battle fleets, in the finest Mahanian tradition, would meet for a decisive engagement, in which American dreadnoughts would prevail. In the final phase, Blue would surround and assault the Japanese home islands and win the war.

Previous to Versailles Treaty’s directive for the handover of the Mandate Islands to Japan, the plan featured an aggressive thrust of the US Fleet across the Pacific toward the recapture of the Philippines. Japanese possession of these islands located astride the sea lanes of communication to both the Philippines and Guam spurred the 1921 modification to the plan to feature a more cautious, island-hopping campaign to defeat the Japanese.6 The nonfortification clause of the Washington Treaty drove much of the planning effort of the 1920s as naval planners were forced to conceive ways in which to conduct an extended naval campaign without the benefit of an advanced base to support it. By 1923 the island-hopping aspects of the plan had been removed in favor of a return to the rapid naval thrust westward.

In the mid-1920s the rapid thrust of Blue capital ships from the West Coast of the United States to retake the Philippines played out with unfavorable attrition during naval war games and was modified to include several logistics stops in route. As President Roosevelt took office these logistics stops along the central thrust toward the recapture of the Philippines had been further modified into an island-hopping campaign through the Mandates themselves.8
Just prior to the election of the new administration, the latest War Plan Orange called for the phased departure of some 317 warships from Pearl Harbor with which to conduct Phase II of the plan.9 At the time, less than 200 warships were in commission. By 1932, the Office of Naval Intelligence, in response to a proposal by the Chief of Naval Operations regarding increased US Navy presence in the Western Pacific as a deterrent to Japanese aggression in Manchuria, responded that they believed the Navy had been so weakened by economic neglect under the Hoover administration that it could not conduct an Orange scenario war.10 Naval War College analysts judged that the US Navy’s capacity to fight in the Western Pacific had declined to “decided inferiority” against their Japanese counterparts.11 Given the capabilities gap between what the Orange plan called for and what the US Fleet was capable of executing at the time, Admiral J. O. Richards, later to command the US Fleet, called the Orange plan, “Less a plan for waging war than a plan to justifying a Navy.”12 Thus, on the eve of President Roosevelt’s arrival, the Navy’s leadership judged the fleet as ill equipped to carry out its principal war plan against its expected enemy. Much was required to remedy this situation, and the Navy hoped that the new administration would champion that effort.

The attack on the USS Panay caused the US Navy to take stock of its capacity--or lack thereof--to deal with an openly hostile Japan. In one case, Rear Admiral George J. Meyer, commander of the 16th Naval District in the Philippines and one of the officers who would likely be among the first to bear the brunt of Japanese aggression, referred to the US Fleet as “woefully weak.” The 1935 revisions to War Plan Orange included an island-hopping campaign en route the Philippines, which would necessarily delay their liberation. To mitigate this delay in arrival of the US Fleet, Admiral Meyer suggested that a major naval base be constructed in the southern Philippines where warships of sufficient strength could be stationed to support US Army forces as the fleet advanced from their West Coast bases.

In late 1937, Admiral Leahy endorsed a proposed revision to the Orange Plan which specified the Army ship two divisions of troops to the Philippines before war broke out or if that proved impossible, to place these divisions under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet, to be used as an amphibious force against Truk, a Japanese fleet facility in the Caroline Islands. Unfortunately, the Army Chief of Staff, General Malin Craig, did not endorse this plan because the peacetime Army of 180,000 men did not possess the manpower to support it. Although they could not reach an accord on this particular revision, both agreed on the importance of defending the Alaska-Hawaii-Panama triangle. As a result of this shift of priority, the Army no longer felt that it should defend the Philippines while the Navy seized advanced bases in the Central Pacific. Although this impasse marked a temporary halt to joint planning against Japan, US Navy planning continued unilaterally and served to influence the General Board’s warship-building recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy.

Admiral Leahy was also very concerned about increasing world tensions and ordered a complete overhaul of the Orange plan to reflect the changing political landscape. At this stage in its development, Plan Orange assumed unilateral US action against Japan who was presumed to be similarly acting alone. Captain Charles Cooke, the lead planner assigned to oversee the revision recommended that the Joint Board, responsible for joint Army-Navy war plans, to abandon the Orange plan in favor of five unique Rainbow plans, each of which assumed that either the US or its opponent was a member of a military alliance. Further recognition of troublesome events in Europe came in June 1938 when the carrier Ranger, four heavy cruisers, four destroyers, and two land-based patrol plane wings were transferred to the East Coast to join the Atlantic Squadron. As a deterrent to further Japanese aggression, Admiral Leahy and President Roosevelt also considered moving the remaining US Pacific Fleet to Hawaii, a move they deferred until later.

The new Rainbow 5 plan was crafted to deal with these significantly changed strategic issues and a reduced US Fleet in the Pacific. Rather than thrusting westward to relieve the Philippines, the plan only obligated the US Fleet to conduct a raid on the Marshall Islands within the first six months of the war’s commencement. Admiral Stark felt that the Philippines would fall early in the war and that the Asiatic Fleet would be forced to retire from the Western Pacific.

He [Short - russo] therefore ordered alert 1, which called for protection against sabotage. Each coastal battery, AA position, and key facility was guarded 24 hours a day, and aircraft were lined up wingtip to wingtip for easier guarding. If Short had selected alert 2 or 3, he would have had to issue ammunition to all of his positions, and he was sure this action would alarm the civilian population, a direct violation of his orders.
Once he decided on alert 1, Short sent a message to the War Department,
“RURD [Reference your radiogram] 472 report department alerted to prevent sabotage liaison with Navy.” The next day, 28 November, Short received a reply from Army Adjutant General MG Emory S. Adams: “critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities . . . initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide protection of your establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage.” As a precaution, Short also ordered the AWS to be in full operation from 0400-0700 everyday. (It was also in operation from 0700-1100 and 1200-1600 Monday through Friday for training.) Short informed Kimmel that he had gone to alert 1, but Kimmel thought alert 1 was the highest alert.